EGSL-01

<aside> đź’ˇ

We define restaking as reusing staked ETH as security for AVSs. Thus, the same Native ETH that is securing the BC (beacon chain) can also be slashed by an AVS, with priority burning rights going to the BC.

</aside>

With this in mind, let’s walk through the scenario:

  1. Alice verifies a validator. withdrawable: 32 ETH
  2. Alice’s operator is slashed for 75%. withdrawable: 8 ETH
  3. Alice is slashed by 16 ETH on the beacon chain
  4. A checkpoint of BC state is proven. withdrawable: 4 ETH

Note that the portion that is marked as  and  has priority burning rights by the beacon chain. 12 ETH has been slashed “twice”, but this is by design given our definition of restaking.

Note that the portion that is marked as BC Slash and BC + AVS Slash has priority burning rights by the beacon chain. 12 ETH has been slashed “twice”, but this is by design given our definition of restaking.

The checkpoint slash has devalued Alice’s currently withdrawable assets by 50%. ****The AVS slashes from what’s left due to the BC getting priority burning rights. AVSs must factor Native ETH (or an LST) being slashed by the beacon chain when designing their slashing conditions.

<aside> đź’ˇ

The behavior of BC and AVS slashings for Native ETH mimics the behavior of slashings for an LST in isolation (see EGSL-02 for edge case). This ensures that Native ETH security is not disadvantaged compared to LST security.

</aside>

Let’s assume that there was 1 unit of LST which had 32 ETH backing it.

  1. Alice deposits 1 LST
  2. Alice is slashed for 75%. Alice now has 0.25 LST
    1. Alice can redeem her 0.25 LST for 0.25 * 32 (backing) = 16 ETH
  3. LST is slashed for 16 ETH on the beacon chain
    1. Only 16 ETH is now backing the LST. Thus, Alice can withdraw 0.25 * 16 (backing) = 4 ETH from the LST protocol

EGSL-02

The ordering of actions may affect the withdrawable shares of a staker, but assets are not overslashed.

<aside> đź’ˇ

When an AVS slashes, its attributable slashed amount is between 0 and the originally slashed amount. The attributable slashed amount decreases in the event of BC slashes.

</aside>

Assume we’re at step 3 in EGSL-01. Let’s go through Scenario A:

  1. Alice verifies another validator. withdrawable: 40 ETH
  2. Alice checkpoints all her pods. withdrawable: 30 ETH

In this scenario, 25% of Alice’s currently proven assets are slashed. Similarly, the AVSs attributable slashed amount has been decreased by 25% (24 → 18 ETH).

Now, in scenario B:

  1. Alice checkpoints her pod. withdrawable: 4 ETH